Tradition between 'reflex' and 'reflection'
Anthony Giddens (n.d.) has argued that modernity destroys tradition. In The Reinvention of Politics, Beck (1997: 6) defines reflexive modernization in terms of 'self-confrontation with the effects of risk society that cannot be dealt with and assimilated in the system of industrial society'. He employs the term 'reflexive' primarily in the sense of 'reflex', rather than 'reflection', to denote both developments that seemingly follow as a reflex to the unintended consequences of earlier actions and decisions, and the impact of these decisions and actions on the actors themselves. Arguably, this diminishes the role of the actor to a reactive rather than a proactive one, even if Beck (1997: 5) insists that multiple modernities are conceivable and indeed feasible. Beck's approach echoes that of Giddens in that it stresses the reactive element of reflexivity, thus suggesting an overly mechanistic, stimulus-response view of a socioecological system. Adam (1996) describes reflexivity as an ontological characteristic of humankind. Any human action is subject to some process of reflection -in the sense of contemplation -on that action, which is in turn an integral part of the action itself. One way of achieving this reflection is through the process of tradition that mediates a given community's trajectory through time and space. Such reflexivity may simply reinterpret or clarify 'tradition', or it may consist in more complex refractions of actions, notions and representations. In the former case, we are dealing with tradition as heritage, whereas in the latter case tradition is more a continuously evolving process of creation, recreation and modification. We are used to thinking about tradition in the former sense, in which 'tradition' is associated with fixed formations derived from the past (or projected into it) that hold back or corrupt progress. It is invoked by 'yesterday's men' as a reflex, in order to stall innovation and change. If necessary or merely opportune, tradition may even be invented, especially in societal contexts where anything with an air of antiquity is already regarded as venerable by definition. Societies where such reflexive stalling mechanisms are strong tend to be referred to as 'traditional', 'pre-modern' or, even less flatteringly, 'backward'. Within this world-view, a 'forward', 'modern' society becomes 'nontraditional' by classificatory default. This, then, is the paradigmatic way of looking at tradition and development. But there is another way.
Elsewhere (Kockel 2002) , I have suggested that cultural practices and artefacts only become 'heritage' once they are no longer in current, active use. In other words, 'heritage' is culture that has (been) dropped
